Behavioral Economics in Customs Policy: Enhancing Compliance through Nudge



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
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1. Introduction

- Tax non-compliance signifies a failure to comply with tax responsibility, either intentionally or unintentionally.
- The main form of non-compliance with customs regulations:
 - Tariff/tax evasion i.e., declaring less goods values, misclassifying, false invoices, falsifying country of origin, avoiding deferred duty after the release of goods, etc.
 - Smuggling



II. Understanding Compliance Behaviors

Compliance can happen by either

- voluntarily results from taxpayers' willingness to follow the tax obligations, arising from their moral views and commitments to society
- enforcedly resulted from concerns over getting detected and fined
- Economic drives e.g., financial incentives
- Psychological drives e.g., social norms, tax fairness, morality, and so on.

Conventional Compliance Model

- Based on the neoclassical economic model
- Try to understand why people do not comply?
 - relies on expected utility function, assuming that individual will maximize their expected utility gained from tax evasion against the risk of being detected and fined.
 - tariff and non-tariff barriers are incentives to evade (compliance cost).
- Lead to deterrence theory, indicating that the higher probability of detection and penalty will deter noncompliance (deterrence effect).

Encouraging compliance approach is the reduction of compliance cost and the increase on probability of detected/fined.

Behavioral Compliance Model

- Based on behavioral economic model
- Try to understand why people comply?
 - relies on non-expected utility functions, the probability an individual perceives is not accurate (subjective probability)
 - people's decisions tend to be biased (individual framing effects)
 - people's decisions are influenced by social interactions, not just driven by self-interests

Encouraging compliance should aim on the enhancement compliance norm/tax morality.

III. WCO Compliance Framework

- "Carrots and Sticks" are deployed to encourage voluntary compliance and hinder intentional violations.
- VCF has divided clients' compliance levels into 4 categories:
 - Type (1) are voluntarily compliant, provided with incentives
 - Type (2) try to be compliant but do not always succeed, provided with assisted compliance
 - Type (3) avoid complying, given with directed compliance
 - And Type (4) deliberately do not comply, given with enforced compliance

What is Nudge?

- Nudge is defined as "any aspect of choice architecture that alters people's behaviour in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives" (p.6).
- Nudge instruments # carrots and sticks approach
- Nudges are employed as a complementary tool rather than a substitution for the conventional approach like the legal enforcement for violations.
 - Loss and Gain Framing
 - Norm Nudge
 - Deterrence Message

IV. Nudging Compliance

Richard H. Thaler Cass R. Sunstein

Nudge

Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness

Loss and Gain Framing

- Loss and gain framing refer to the way that information could be framed before conveying to the client.
- Negative framing focuses potential loss outcomes, while positive framing highlights gain outcomes.
 - if companies are concerned about positive gains like simplification of procedures, then the information should be conveyed the potential gain of that
 - if taxpayers want to avoid negative outcomes like losing the reduced regulatory scrutiny, then the framing should include the potential loss of that

• Loss and gain framing could apply to type 1 client to remain complying as well as type 2 and 3 to pay more attention to their compliance behavior.

Norm Nudge

• Norm nudge targets social norms (inform of what others are doing or what should be

done) and moral suasion (make consequences of moral decisions visible)

- Information campaign, focusing on tax's benefits to society and tax fairness
- Include tax morality and compliance norm in reminding messages, focusing on the need for compliance cooperation
- Peer effects in reminding message, i.e., informing that majority of other taxpayers are complying.
- Norm nudge could apply to all types of clients to increase their perceived compliance norm; however, type 3 should be specifically targeted, presumed that their compliance avoidance may be caused by the lack of social norms and intrinsic motivation.

Deterrence Message

- To raise concerns over detection capability and penalty degree by including threat and warning sentences in reminding letters to pay tax.
 - Threating of being audited/fined
 - Threating of being "named and shamed"
- The deterrence letter can induce the type 3 client to revise their beliefs about the detection probability and pull back their non-compliance intention.

Limitation

- Nudge approach is still a new integration with the policy domain.
- Most of the behavioral evidence are from experimental studies, which are still concerned over its validity in a real intervention application
- Its reliability and tenacity in another situation or overtime is still a question.
- Evidences are found in taxation administration rather than the applicability in customs administration

Conclusion

- Nudge interventions can help tackle willingness to comply subconsciously and remind taxpayers to be more conscious of compliance choice, especially to clients with unintentional mistakes (Type 2) and low-key intentional avoidance (Type 3).
- More explorations of behavioral economics and nudges are required to ensure its efficiency and applicability in one respective social infrastructure and customs context.

THANK YOU!!