

Behavioral Economics in Customs Policy: Enhancing Compliance through Nudge



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1. Introduction

- Tax non-compliance signifies a failure to comply with tax responsibility, either intentionally or unintentionally.
- The main form of non-compliance with customs regulations:
 - Tariff/tax evasion i.e., declaring less goods values, misclassifying, false invoices, falsifying country of origin, avoiding deferred duty after the release of goods, etc.
 - Smuggling



II. Understanding Compliance Behaviors

- ❖ Compliance can happen by either
 - **voluntarily** results from taxpayers' willingness to follow the tax obligations, arising from their moral views and commitments to society
 - **enforcedly** resulted from concerns over getting detected and fined
- ❖ Economic drives e.g., financial incentives
- ❖ Psychological drives e.g., social norms, tax fairness, morality, and so on.

Conventional Compliance Model

- Based on the neoclassical economic model
 - Try to understand why people do not comply?
 - relies on **expected utility function**, assuming that individual will maximize their expected utility gained from tax evasion against the risk of being detected and fined.
 - tariff and non-tariff barriers are incentives to evade (compliance cost).
 - Lead to deterrence theory, indicating that the higher probability of detection and penalty will deter non-compliance (deterrence effect).
- Encouraging compliance approach is the reduction of compliance cost and the increase on probability of detected/fined.

Behavioral Compliance Model

- Based on behavioral economic model
 - Try to understand why people comply?
 - relies on **non-expected utility functions**, the probability an individual perceives is not accurate (subjective probability)
 - people's decisions tend to be biased (**individual framing effects**)
 - people's decisions are influenced by **social interactions**, not just driven by self-interests
- Encouraging compliance should aim on the enhancement compliance norm/tax morality.



III. WCO Compliance Framework

- “**Carrots and Sticks**” are deployed to encourage voluntary compliance and hinder intentional violations.
- VCF has divided clients’ compliance levels into 4 categories:
 - **Type (1)** are voluntarily compliant, provided with incentives
 - **Type (2)** try to be compliant but do not always succeed, provided with assisted compliance
 - **Type (3)** avoid complying, given with directed compliance
 - And **Type (4)** deliberately do not comply, given with enforced compliance

What is Nudge?

- Nudge is defined as “*any aspect of choice architecture that alters people’s behaviour in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives*” (p.6).
- Nudge instruments # carrots and sticks approach
- Nudges are employed as a complementary tool rather than a substitution for the conventional approach like the legal enforcement for violations.
 - Loss and Gain Framing
 - Norm Nudge
 - Deterrence Message

Richard H. Thaler
Cass R. Sunstein

Nudge



Improving Decisions
About Health, Wealth,
and Happiness

Loss and Gain Framing

- Loss and gain framing refer to the way that information could be framed before conveying to the client.
- Negative framing focuses potential loss outcomes, while positive framing highlights gain outcomes.
 - if companies are concerned about positive gains like simplification of procedures, then the information should be conveyed the potential gain of that
 - if taxpayers want to avoid negative outcomes like losing the reduced regulatory scrutiny, then the framing should include the potential loss of that
- Loss and gain framing could apply to **type 1** client to remain complying as well as **type 2 and 3** to pay more attention to their compliance behavior.

Norm Nudge

- Norm nudge targets **social norms** (inform of what others are doing or what should be done) and **moral suasion** (make consequences of moral decisions visible)
 - Information campaign, focusing on tax's benefits to society and tax fairness
 - Include tax morality and compliance norm in reminding messages, focusing on the need for compliance cooperation
 - Peer effects in reminding message, i.e., informing that majority of other taxpayers are complying.
- Norm nudge could apply to **all types of clients** to increase their perceived compliance norm; however, **type 3 should be specifically targeted**, presumed that their compliance avoidance may be caused by the lack of social norms and intrinsic motivation.

Deterrence Message

- To raise concerns over detection capability and penalty degree by including threat and warning sentences in reminding letters to pay tax.
 - Threatening of being audited/fined
 - Threatening of being “named and shamed”
- The deterrence letter can induce the type 3 client to revise their beliefs about the detection probability and pull back their non-compliance intention.

Limitation

- Nudge approach is still a new integration with the policy domain.
- Most of the behavioral evidence are from experimental studies, which are still concerned over its validity in a real intervention application
- Its reliability and tenacity in another situation or overtime is still a question.
- Evidences are found in taxation administration rather than the applicability in customs administration

Conclusion

- Nudge interventions can help tackle willingness to comply subconsciously and remind taxpayers to be more conscious of compliance choice, especially to clients with unintentional mistakes (Type 2) and low-key intentional avoidance (Type 3).
- More explorations of behavioral economics and nudges are required to ensure its efficiency and applicability in one respective social infrastructure and customs context.

THANK YOU!!