

#### Intro

- ► Title:
  - » "Cybersecurity Incident Response It is More Than Just a Plan in the IT Department"
- Overview:
  - » Incident Response is often treated as a plan or checklist that lives within the IT department that is utilized whenever alerts and alarm bells go off. In this session we'll take a look at the basics of incident response and then go beyond into the interconnected processes that make up and extend the Incident Response process such as roles and responsibilities (both identified and necessary), risk management (including third & fourth parties), logging and monitoring for event alerting, incident investigation and escalation, incident communication (notice), insurance considerations, and recovery & restoration resources. We'll also review and connect you with a checklist for broadening the discussion of Incident Response outside of the IT Department.
- This session will cover the following:
  - » Recognize Incident Response as a Multifaceted Process
  - » Participants will gain an appreciation for the multifaceted nature of incident response, moving beyond IT-centric views to understand the interconnected elements, roles, and responsibilities that comprise an effective response strategy.
  - » Identify Key Components of Comprehensive Incident Response
  - » Attendees will be able to identify critical interdependent components of incident response enabling them to evaluate and enhance their organization's readiness for incident response.
  - » Enable Broader Incident Response Engagement
  - » Attendees will be equipped to initiate discussions about incident response across various departments and industries, fostering a more inclusive and organization-wide approach to cybersecurity resilience.





Cybersecurity
Incident Response –
It is More Than Just a
Plan in the IT
Department



## Agenda

- Challenge
- Event vs Incident
- What Do the Frameworks & Standards Say?
- Guidelines Outside of Controls
- Nuances
  - » Roles & Responsibilities
  - » Risk Mgmt Third & Fourth Party
  - » Logging & Monitoring
  - » Incident Notices
- ► Tools And Resources
- Perspective & Next Steps
- Your Questions



## Today's Presenter

WSET – Level 1
Chip and Dip Connoisseur
Dallas, TX – Native



Trip Hillman

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Assumptions for this conversation:

Have a Corporate Network / Computer / Smartphone / Tablet Use Data — Data Base / Stores / Lake, Spreadsheets, Reports, etc. Interact with Applications — Internal Systems, Online SaaS Solutions, Vendor Solutions, APIs, etc.

**Expect Those Things to Work!** 



## When I hear Incident Response I Feel...



**OR** 





## Challenge

# We've Got a Plan & We Think it Works

Me: What Would You Do If *X* Happened?

Them: We'd call you...

- Frameworks, Standards, Compliance Regs
  - » NIST-CSF, CIS-CSC
  - » NIST 800-53, NIST 800-171, ISO 27001
  - » PCI-DSS, DoD CMMC, NERC/FERC
- ► Industry/Trade Groups
- ► Insurance Providers
- Government Agency Guidance
  - » DHS-CRR
  - » Local State Requirements
- Vendor/Supplier Specifications



## Cybersecurity Event vs Incident



#### **Event**

A cybersecurity event is a change in the normal behavior of a given system, process, environment or workflow.

#### Examples of a cybersecurity event:

- An employee flags a suspicious email
- Someone downloads software (authorized or unauthorized) to a company device
- A security lapse occurs due to a server outage



#### **Incident**

An incident is a change in a system that negatively impacts the organization, municipality, or business.

#### **Examples of an incident:**

- An employee replies to a phishing email, divulging confidential information
- Equipment with stored sensitive data is stolen
- A password is compromised through a brute force attack on your system





## Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain

#### Phases of the Intrusion Kill Chain



Reconnaissance



Research, identification, and selection of targets



Weaponization



Pairing remote access malware with exploit into a deliverable payload (e.g. Adobe PDF and Microsoft Office files)



Delivery



Transmission of weapon to target (e.g. via email attachments, websites, or USB drives)



**Exploitation** 



Once delivered, the weapon's code is triggered, exploiting vulnerable applications or systems




Installation



The weapon installs a backdoor on a target's system allowing persistent access



Command & Control






Actions on Objective

The attacker works to achieve the objective of the intrusion, which can include exfiltration or destruction of data, or intrusion of another target

https://www.sans.org/blog/cyber-kill-chain-mitre-attack-purple-team



Pyramid of Pain



https://www.sans.org/blog/cyber-kill-chain-mitre-attack-purple-team/



#### MITRE ATT&CK Framework

Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Execution	Collection	Exfiltration
51 items	27 items	49 items	18 items	17 items	17 items	25 items	13 items	9 items
.bash_profile and .bashrc  Accessibility Features T1015	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation Binary Padding	Account Manipulation Bash History	Account Discovery Application Window	AppleScript Application Deployment	AppleScript  Command-Line Interface	Audio Capture Automated Collection	Automated Exfiltration  Data Compressed
AppCert DLLs	Accessibility Features	Bypass User Account Control	Brute Force	Discovery	Software	Dynamic Data Exchange	Browser Extensions	Data Encrypted
Applnit DLLs	AppCert DLLs	Clear Command History	Credential Dumping	File and Directory Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Execution through API	Clipboard Data	Data Transfer Size
Application Shimming	Applnit DLLs Application Shimming	Code Signing	Credentials in Files	Network Service	Exploitation of	Execution through Module Load	Data from Local System	Limits  Exfiltration Over
Authentication Package	Bypass User Account	Component Firmware	Exploitation of Vulnerability	Scanning	Vulnerability	Graphical User Interface	Data from Network	Alternative Protocol
Bootkit	Control	Component Object Model Hijacking	Forced Authentication	Network Share Discovery	Logon Scripts  Pass the Hash	InstallUtil	Shared Drive	Exfiltration Over
Browser Extensions	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or	Hooking	Peripheral Device Discovery	Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket	Launchctl	Data from Removable Media	Command and Contro Channel
Change Default File Association	Dylib Hijacking	Information	Input Capture	Permission Groups	Remote Desktop	Local Job Scheduling	Data Staged	Exfiltration Over Othe
Component Firmware	Exploitation of	Disabling Security Tools	Input Prompt	Discovery Process Discovery	Protocol	LSASS Driver	Email Collection	Network Medium  Exfiltration Over
Component Object Model Hijacking	Vulnerability	DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading	Keychain	Query Registry	Remote File Copy	Mshta	Input Capture	Physical Medium
Create Account	Extra Window Memory Injection	Exploitation of Vulnerability	LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning	Remote System	Remote Services	PowerShell	Man in the Browser	Scheduled Transfer
DLL Search Order Hijacking	File System Permissions	Extra Window Memory Injection	Network Sniffing	Discovery	Replication Through Removable Media	Regsvcs/Regasm	Screen Capture	
Dylib Hijacking	Weakness	File Deletion	Password Filter DLL	Security Software Discovery	Shared Webroot	Regsvr32	Video Capture	
External Remote Services	Hooking	File System Logical Offsets	Private Keys  Replication Through	System Information	SSH Hijacking	Rundll32 Scheduled Task		
File System Permissions	Image File Execution Options Injection	Gatekeeper Bypass	Removable Media	Discovery	Taint Shared Content	Scripting		
Weakness  Hidden Files and Directories	Launch Daemon	Hidden Files and Directories	Securityd Memory	System Network Configuration Discovery	Third-party Software	Service Execution		
Hooking	New Service	Hidden Users	Two-Factor Authentication Interception	System Network	Windows Admin Shares	Source		
Hypervisor	Path Interception	Hidden Window	merespitan	Connections Discovery	Windows Remote Management	Space after Filename		
Image File Execution	Plist Modification	HISTCONTROL		System Owner/User Discovery		Third-party Software		
Ontions Injection	attack mitre	Image File Execution Options				-		


https://attack.mitre.org/




## What Do The Frameworks Say?

- NIST 800-53r5 Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations
- ► CIS CSC Center for Internet Security Critical Security Controls
- NIST CSF Cybersecurity Framework v2.0
- NIST 800-171 Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Systems and Organizations
- NIST 800-61r2 Computer Security Incident Handling Guide







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800-53


Revision 5

Security Controls



## Largest Influence

- ► NIST 800-61r2
- 4 Major Phases
  - » Preparation
  - » Detection & Analysis
  - » Containment Eradication & Recovery
  - » Post-Incident Activity





## NIST 800-61r2 – Computer Security Incident Handling Guide

- Incident Handling Checklist Included
- Value in the Appendix
  - » Appendix-A
    - 11 Scenarios
  - » Appendix-B
    - Types of Info to Collect
- Best Definitions
- ► And... It's Free

National Institute of Standards and Technology U.S. Department of Commerce

Special Publication 800-6 Revision 2

#### Computer Security Incident Handling Guide

Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology

Paul Cichonski Tom Millar Tim Grance Karen Scarfone

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-61r2

	Action	Complete	
Detection and Analysis			
1.	Determine whether an incident has occurred		
1.1	Analyze the precursors and indicators		
1.2	Look for correlating information		
1.3	Perform research (e.g., search engines, knowledge base)		
1.4	As soon as the handler believes an incident has occurred, begin documenting the investigation and gathering evidence		
2.	Prioritize handling the incident based on the relevant factors (functional impact, information impact, recoverability effort, etc.)		
3.	Report the incident to the appropriate internal personnel and external organizations		
	Containment, Eradication, and Recovery		
4.	Acquire, preserve, secure, and document evidence		
5.	Contain the incident		
6.	Eradicate the incident		
6.1	Identify and mitigate all vulnerabilities that were exploited		
6.2	Remove malware, inappropriate materials, and other components		
6.3	If more affected hosts are discovered (e.g., new malware infections), repeat the Detection and Analysis steps (1.1, 1.2) to identify all other affected hosts, then contain (5) and eradicate (6) the incident for them		
7.	Recover from the incident		
7.1	Return affected systems to an operationally ready state		
7.2	Confirm that the affected systems are functioning normally		
7.3	If necessary, implement additional monitoring to look for future related activity		
	Post-Incident Activity	<u> </u>	
8.	Create a follow-up report		
9.	Hold a lessons learned meeting (mandatory for major incidents, optional otherwise)		



#### NIST 800-53r5

- ▶ IR-1: Policy and Procedures
- ► IR-2: Incident Response Training
- ► IR-3: Incident Response Testing
- ► IR-4: Incident Handling
- ► IR-5: Incident Monitoring
- ► IR-6: Incident Reporting
- ► IR-7: Incident Response Assistance
- ▶ IR-8: Incident Response Plan
- ▶ IR-9: Information Spillage Response

- Incident handling capability for incidents that is consistent with the incident response plan
  - includes preparation, detection and analysis, containment, eradication, and recovery
- Coordinate incident handling activities with contingency planning activities
- Incorporate lessons learned from
- Ensure the rigor, intensity, scope, and results of incident handling activities are comparable and predictable across the organization

IR-4(1): Automated Incident Handling Processes

IR-4(2): Dynamic Reconfiguration

IR-4(3): Continuity of Operations

IR-4(4): Information Correlation

IR-4(5): Automatic Disabling of System

IR-4(6): Insider Threats

IR-4(7): Insider Threats – Intra-organization Coordination

IR-4(8): Correlation with External Organizations

IR-4(9): Dynamic Response Capability

IR-4(10): Supply Chain Coordination

IR-4(11): Integrated Incident Response Team

IR-4(12): Malicious Code and Forensic Analysis

IR-4(13): Behavior Analysis

IR-4(14): Security Operations Center

IR-4(15): Public Relations and Reputation Repair



#### NIST CSF 2.0

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) released the Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 on February 26, 2024.

- RS.MA: Incident Management
  - » RS.MA-01: The incident response plan is executed in coordination with relevant third parties once an incident is declared
  - » RS.MA-02: Incident reports are triaged and validated
  - » RS.MA-03: Incidents are categorized and prioritized
  - » RS.MA-04: Incidents are escalated or elevated as needed
  - » RS.MA-05: The criteria for initiating incident recovery are applied
- RS.AN: Incident Analysis
  - » RS.AN-03: Analysis is performed to establish what has taken place during an incident and the root cause of the incident
  - » RS.AN-06: Actions performed during an investigation are recorded, and the records' integrity and provenance are preserved
  - » RS.AN-07: Incident data and metadata are collected, and their integrity and provenance are preserved
  - » RS.AN-08: An incident's magnitude is estimated and validated
- RS.CO: Incident Response Reporting And Communication
  - » RS.CO-02: Internal and external stakeholders are notified of incidents
  - » RS.CO-03: Information is shared with designated internal and external stakeholders
- RS.MI: Incident Mitigation
  - » RS.MI-01: Incidents are contained
  - » RS.MI-02: Incidents are eradicated





#### CIS CSC v8 - #17




- ▶ 17.1: Designate Personnel to Manage Incident Handling
- ▶ 17.2: Establish and Maintain Contact Information for Reporting Security Incidents
- ▶ 17.3: Establish and Maintain an Enterprise Process for Reporting Incidents
- ▶ 17.4: Establish and Maintain an Incident Response Process
- ▶ 17.5: Assign Key Roles and Responsibilities
- ▶ 17.6: Define Mechanisms for Communicating During Incident Response
- ▶ 17.7: Conduct Routine Incident Response Exercises
- ▶ 17.8: Conduct Post-Incident Reviews
- ▶ 17.9: Establish and Maintain Security Incident Thresholds



#### NIST 800-171r2

- ▶ 3.6.1: Establish an operational incident-handling capability for organizational systems that includes preparation, detection, analysis, containment, recovery, and user response activities
- 3.6.2: Track, document, and report incidents to designated officials and/or authorities both internal and external to the organization
- 3.6.3: Test the organizational incident response capability





#### Common Issues Observed

- Roles & Responsibilities Not Granularly Defined
  - » "We think we know who we need but we don't write it down"
  - "It's always going to be XYZ who handles that"
  - » "Our IT/Security function is outsourced to ABC vendor who handles IR"
- Lack of Logs = Lack of Proof
  - » Ironically the people that say "we're not spending any more on storage?" are also the people saying "why can't we prove what happened?"
  - » API usage logs?
- "But we have Cyber Insurance..."
  - » i.e. you probably have missing incident handling procedures
- "Immutable? I Don't Know But Our Backups are Encrypted"
  - » Ransomware as a Service Better 'Customer' Service but also Payment even more so **Doesn't** Equal Recovery Results
- ► Third/Fourth Party Considerations
  - » "That's not our system though..."
  - » "We have a contract / SLA in place"
  - » Think MOVEit







#### Point of Reflections and Quick Wins

- Usable Contact Info Readily Available
  - » For Primary and Backup Employees
  - » Critical Vendors/Service Providers
  - » Legal Counsel
  - » Insurance
- Dial the Numbers & Write the Text
  - » Had a phone in the Ops Center that couldn't dial international numbers
- Meet with GC/Legal Today
  - » What can you authorize, say, or do?
- ▶ Note Actions / Outcomes from Current IR TTX Exercises
  - » You did the exercise, but what did you learn / improve



#### Incident Response Checklist for Non-IT Executives







	Case of Cyber Emergency: is out and share with executives, general counsel, public information/
PR c	ontacts and others who might need to assist in a cyber response:
Our incluent kesponse r	un is localed fiele.
File path:	
Physical copies:	
Date of last Incident Res	ponse Plan exercise/test:
Our cyber first responder	s are:
Our response authorized	decision-makers are:
Our cyber insurance car	rier is:
Contact name an	d phone:
Our incident communica	ation lead is:
Other things to know:	

To learn more about how Weaver can help you improve or manage cybersecurity, visit https://weaver.com/services/cybersecurity.

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#### Cyber Placemat



Program & Control Frameworks  NIST 800-53 CIS CSC NIST CSF ISO 27001 CSA CCM  Compliance Requirements	Organization Overview:  Name: Mission: Goals: Purpose: Strategy/Vision: Values:  Purpose of the System:
■ 800-171	
□ сммс	Objectives & Features:
☐ PCI-DSS	
☐ HIPAA	
■ NERC / FERC	
☐ NERC / FERC☐ FFIEC	Critical Roles & Responsibilities
•	Critical Roles & Responsibilities:
☐ FFIEC	Critical Roles & Responsibilities:
☐ FFIEC ☐ FISMA	Critical Roles & Responsibilities:
☐ FFIEC ☐ FISMA	Critical Roles & Responsibilities:
☐ FFIEC ☐ FISMA ☐ FedRAMP	Critical Roles & Responsibilities:  Stakeholders:
☐ FFIEC ☐ FISMA ☐ FedRAMP  Additional	Stakeholders: External
☐ FFIEC ☐ FISMA ☐ FedRAMP  Additional Guidance	Stakeholders:  External  Citizens/Customers:
FFIEC FISMA FedRAMP  Additional Guidance DHS CPG	Stakeholders:  External  Citizens/Customers:  Regulators:  Legal Counsel:
FFIEC FISMA FedRAMP  Additional Guidance DHS CPG DHS CRR	Stakeholders:  External  Citizens/Customers:  Regulators:  Legal Counsel:  Consultants:
FFIEC FISMA FedRAMP  Additional Guidance DHS CPG DHS CRR MITRE	Stakeholders:  External  Citizens/Customers:  Regulators:  Legal Counsel:  Consultants:  Service Providers:
FFIEC FISMA FedRAMP  Additional Guidance DHS CPG DHS CRR MITRE ATT&CK	Stakeholders:  External  Citizens/Customers:  Regulators:  Legal Counsel:  Consultants:  Service Providers:
FFIEC FISMA FedRAMP  Additional Guidance DHS CPG DHS CRR MITRE ATT&CK MITRE	Stakeholders:  External  Citizens/Customers:  Regulators:  Consultants:  Service Providers:  Internal  Governance Board:  Executive Leadership:
FFIEC FISMA FedRAMP  Additional Guidance DHS CPG DHS CRR MITRE ATT&CK MITRE D3FEND	Stakeholders:  External  Citizens/Customers:  Regulators:  Consultants:  Service Providers:  Internal  Governance Board:  Executive Leadership:  Management Team:
FFIEC FISMA FedRAMP  Additional Guidance DHS CPG DHS CRR MITRE ATT&CK MITRE D3FEND MITRE	Stakeholders:  External  Citizens/Customers:  Regulators:  Consultants:  Service Providers:  Internal  Governance Board:  Executive Leadership:

System Security Officer:

Tvr	oes of data Handled:
	Employee PII
	□Stored □Processed □Transmitted
	Users/Citizen/Constituent/Student/Custom
	er PII
	□Stored □Processed □Transmitted
	Sensitive / Classified Data
	□Stored □Processed □Transmitted
	Financial Data
	□Stored □Processed □Transmitted
	Payment/Credit Card Data
	□Stored □Processed □Transmitted
	Health/Medical Data
	□Stored □Processed □Transmitted
	Legal/CJIS Data
_	□Stored □Processed □Transmitted
	Compliance/Regulatory Data
_	□Stored □Processed □Transmitted
	GIS Data
П	□Stored □Processed □Transmitted
ч.	Environmental/Natural Resource Data  □Stored □Processed □Transmitted
	Other:
_	□Stored □Processed □Transmitted
	Other:
	□Stored □Processed □Transmitted
	Other:
	□Stored □Processed □Transmitted
	Other:
	□Stored □Processed □Transmitted
	Other:
	□Stored □Processed □Transmitted
`	
Hov	v We Define a Technology Asset:
	···
	. Wanda Wa Bata One Taske alam
	v Would We Rate Our Technology
_	et Inventory
	omprehensive 🗆 Incomplete

- 4	
1	Systems & Connected Resources:
	Resources
	☐ Cloud/Shared
	□laaS □PaaS □SaaS □FaaS
	□On-Prem □Co-located □Hosted
	□ Application 1:
	☐ Component Inventory Location:
	☐ Responsible Personnel:
	☐ Application 2:
	☐ Component Inventory Location:
	☐ Responsible Personnel:
	☐ Application 3:
	☐ Component Inventory Location:
	Responsible Personnel:
	☐ Storage Locations not Inventoried with Application
	☐ Cloud Storage:
	☐ Database:
	☐ Network/Fileshare:
	☐ Cache Locations:
	☐ Log Locations:
	☐ Backup Locations:

Shared Systems &

Processes:

□ CRM

☐ HR Systems
☐ ERP & Financial

Systems

□ Contract Systems

☐ Identity Systems

□ Billing/Invoicing

☐ Time/Expense

Entry

■ LDAP/Active

Directory

□ Cloud Access

Access

Security Broker

□ Okta

☐ Duo

☐ Ping

Management

☐ Other☐ Privileged

Note: Separately referenced application inventories should include all system components including hardware device type, Serial #, OS Version, Software version(s), and libraries.

Key Devices (IT / OT): ☐ Servers ■ Workstations □ Desktops □ Laptops ■ VDI/Thin Clients ■ Mobile Devices Personnel: ■ Smart Phones □ Tablets □ ют ■ Network Components Processes: ☐ Firewall ■ Load Balancer ■ Security Appliances ■ XYZ ☐ Hosted / Cloud ■ XYZ

☐ Connections / APIs

☐ XYZ

■ XYZ


Other Component



#### Download for Resources



SCAN ME





#### **Cyber Audit Universe**

NOTE: These are considerations only and the decision and ownership is dependent on the environment and risk management.

#### Year 1

- Foundational
  - Cybersecurity Program
  - Risk Assessment
  - Plan / Strategy Roadmap
  - Policy Review
- Core
  - Asset Management Inventory
  - Vulnerability Management
  - Vendor Management
  - IAM
    - Account Management
    - Multi-Factor
       Authentication

#### Year 2

- **Configuration Management** 
  - Patch management
- Logging and Monitoring
  - Log sources
  - Detection capabilities
  - Existing Alerts
  - Investigation / Triage
- Backup & Recovery
  - Business Continuity
     Plan / Disaster
     Recovery
  - Ransomware
- Incident Response
- App/Service Security
  - Development (SDLC/DevOps)
  - API Security
  - Code Repository Management
  - Threat modeling

#### Year 3


- Cyber Insurance
- Board Communication
- Third and Fourth Party Risk Management
- Mobile Device Management
- Mergers and Acquisitions
- Physical Security

## For Consideration

- Leadership
  - Staffing & Resources
  - Skills/Capabilities
    - IT/Infosec Training
- Software Development Lifecycle
- Secure Network Design/Architecture
- Endpoint Detection and Response
  - Email Security
- Security AwarenessTraining
  - Phishing exercises
- Penetration Testing




### **Cyber Program Perspective**






#### Local Resource

- ► IIA GTAG
  - » Auditing Cyber Incident Response & Recovery
- **ISACA** 
  - » SecurityIncidentManagementAudit Program







- NIST CSF (Cybersecurity Framework) Integration
  - » <a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/nistir/8374/">https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/nistir/8374/</a> draft
- Associated Audit Topics
  - » Incident Response
  - » Detection & Monitoring
  - » Recovery (BCP/DR)
  - » Threat/Risk Asmt.



#### **Cybersecurity Framework Profile for Ransomware Risk Management**

f 🎐

**Date Published:** September 2021 **Comments Due:** October 8, 2021

Email Comments to: ransomware@nist.gov

#### Author(s)

William Barker (Dakota Consulting), Karen Scarfone (Scarfone Cybersecurity), William Fisher (NIST), Murugiah Souppaya (NIST)

#### Announcement

This revised draft addresses the public comments provided for the preliminary draft released in June 2021.

Ransomware is a type of malware that encrypts an organization's data and demands payment as a condition of restoring access to that data. In some instances, ransomware may also steal an organization's information and demand additional payment in return for not disclosing the information to authorities, competitors, or the public. Ransomware attacks target organizations' data or critical infrastructure, disrupting or halting operations.

This report defines a Ransomware Profile, which identifies security objectives from the NIST Cybersecurity Framework that support preventing, responding to, and recovering from ransomware events. The profile can be used as a guide to managing the risk of ransomware events. That includes helping gauge an organization's level of readiness to mitigate ransomware threats and to react to the potential impact of events.

#### **DOCUMENTATION**

#### **Publication:**

☑ NISTIR 8374 (Draft) (DOI)
☐ Local Download

#### Supplemental Material:

None available

#### **Document History:**

06/09/21: <u>NISTIR 8374 (Draft)</u> 09/08/21: NISTIR 8374 (Draft)

#### **TOPICS**

#### Security and Privacy

malware

#### Applications

cybersecurity framework



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#### Common Questions Asked "For a Friend"

- ► How often do we need to organize a table top exercise? And who needs to be involved?
- ▶ If IT functions are outsourced to a service provider, who own's the Incident Response function?
- What in Incident Response has surprised you the most?
- What are the leading regulatory "gotcha's" for incident response?



## Polling Question #1

Does your organization have a cybersecurity incident response plan?

- A) Yes And it would work for cyber incidents from the news
- B) Yes But it wouldn't work for cyber incidents from the news
- > C) No But we'll have one shortly after this talk
- > D) Unsure But I'm looking through the files now
- E) I'm legally bound from talking about this based on a prior issue that may or may not have happened



## Polling Question #2

Do you test/validate your incident response plan at least annually with responders and executives?

- > A) Yes, at least annually
- > B) Yes, but greater than a year ago
- > C) No, but it is on the plan now!
- > D) No, we're all good
- > E) Unsure



## Polling Question #3

Do you leverage the MITRE ATT&CK framework in your environment?

- > A) Yes
- ➤ B) No
- > C) Unsure